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Abstract 
According to studies, Android is having the highest market share in smartphone operating systems. The number of Android apps (i.e. 
applications) are increasing day by day. Consequent threats and attacks on Android are also rising. There are a large number of apps which 
bypass users by hiding their functionalities and send users sensitive information and data across the network. Due to flexibility and openness of 
Android operating system, attack surfaces are being introduced every other day. 
In this paper, we are addressing detection of two fatal malware attacks; intent based hijacking and authenticated session hijacking. We have 
used the concept of honey-pot in detection of these two authentication hijacking problems. In order to achieve this, we have tested various apps 
and their interaction with the honey-pot maintained by real device or an emulator. We have designed benign app as a honey framed app. We 
argue that hijacking malware can be detected with higher accuracy using our method at run-time as compared to the traditional machine learning 
methods. Our approach, Anti-Hijack, which has provided the detection accuracy as high as 96%. This has been highly accurate to detect the 
unwanted interaction between hijacking malware and designed benign app. We have tested our approach on a strong data-set of Android apps for 
experiment and identifying vulnerable points. Our detection method Anti-Hijack is a novel contribution in this area which provides light weight, 
device operated run-time detection at hijacking malware. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of organizing committee of the ICISP2015. 
Keywords: Android malware; Anti-Hijack; intent; vulnerabilities; smartphone; security; honey-pot. 
1. Introduction 
Mobile operating system, like the desktop operating system has a major impact in the operating system market 16. Popular 
and largest market share holder operating systems in the smartphone market are Android and iOS. Google Android was released 
as a flexible and open source operating system being adapted by many hardware vendors. It covers approximate 90% market 
share in Q4 of 2014 18. Popularity of Android operating system is due to many features like access to wide variety of Personally 
Identifiable Information (PII), wide array of hardware, application integrated Google services, good user widget, large number of 
apps in many app stores, flexible and also openness in availability 17, 18. As soon as number of apps and activation of Android 
devices are increasing parallel attacks and vulnerable points are also increasing 14.
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Vulnerabilities are weak points which reduce systems information security assurance. It is an intersection of three linked 
element which are system flaws, attack access to system flaws and attacker capability to exploit the flaw. When an attacker uses
application tool or techniques then this vulnerable point is used as an attack surface 
24
.
2. Related Work 
Chin, Erika et al. 
23
 analyse Android apps execution and identify hijack risks in apps components. They develop a tool 
ComDroid that identifies app’s communication vulnerability. Their analysis provides that developer usually use the robust field
of a component like logic instead of explicit logic of the intent, which has the unusual disadvantages of making intent public.
Kelly Casteel,Owen Derby, Dennis Wilson
27
 build a working exploit which takes advantages of intent based vulnerability & 
develop a statically arranged Android analysis framework to impose an app for malign content infected parts. Sebastian H¨obarth
and Rene Mayrhofer provide additional access to application permanent privilege escalation is required. They present a 
framework that can uses arbitrary temporary exploits on Android de-vices to achieve permanent root capabilities.Roee Hay 
26
presents a new found vulnerability in Android which breaks its sandbox process. This vulnerability uses many apps also system 
intent apps. Adam Cozzette 
24
 focuses on Intent spoofing attacks, by taking an attack scenario where a vulnerable application 
has components which only expects to receive intents from other component of same application. Okolie C.C et al. 
20
 maintain 
glide checking of Android smartphones with the help of an app process maturation to change some configure methods for 
compiling data and vulnerable intent. In this paper, a phenomenon is given to test and indicating the strong network of the 
Android using the new slide testing and hijacking tool related to Linux. The result identifies that there is an identification in the 
security range of the different Android device versions but version 4.2 is more robust than the others. Mansfield-Devine, Steve
29
 describe the week points of Android Architecture by using MWR’s exploitation framework mercury. They analyse cross 
application exploitation, Inter app communication and SQL-Injection vulnerability with the existing modules of mercury 
framework. Enck, William and Gilbert et al. 
25
 maintain how third-party app’s uses their private data for processing. They uses a 
new concept as TaintDroid, an e cient system-range dynamic taint detection and analysis system providing of simultaneously 
identifying multiple sources of user’s sensitive data. TaintDroid provides 
realtime analysis by using Android virtualized execution environment. 
` 19
present an Android app T.BIeasing et al.
sand-boxing technique which is used to find static as well as dynamic analysis with Android apps to ineluctably notice malign 
app’s. Static analysis is used to find the app’s for malign activity with no runnable instance. Dynamic anal-ysis is used to install 
an app in a block of isolated environment which is sandbox. Sandbox performs and maintains app identification with the 
Android device for execution. Cerbo et al. 
21
 demonstrate logic for smartphone activity based execution, to notice malign app’s 
which are hiding their activities. This logic is mainly imposed with the Android device and applies on its secure component 
specially permissions in each app’s. Je Lessard and Gary C. Kessler 
28
 present an experiment in acquiring information from an 
Android device using multiple methods dd analysis with FTK, creating a dd image of memory, examination of Memory, 
recovered documents, logical examination, logical analysis of specific databases, data extraction with the CelleBrite UFED. 
We have designed a runtime malware detection framework named Anti-Hijack which is working on two fatal malware 
attacks related to intent and session. We have used the technique of honey-pot based environment to identify session and intent
based malware. The accuracy of Anti-Hijack is as high as 96% in Subsection 6.1. Anti-Hijack generates less false positive 
because no legitimate or benign application uses honey-pot log file. We have measured efficiency of Anti-Hijack using tenfold 
cross validation after calculating precision, recall and H-mean in Subsection 6.2. The statistical comparison of Anti-Hijack with 
other existing related work is in Table 1. 
Framework/Tools Accuracy (in %) H-Mean 
ComDroid 70 -
Kelly et al. 80 -
SandBox 85 .783
Adam et al. 84 -
TaintDroid 90 .801
Cerbo et al. 86 .79
Je  et al. 81 -
Anti-Hijack 96 .834
Table 1: Statistical comparison of Anti-Hijack with existing related work 
589 Venkatesh Gauri Shankar and Gaurav Somani /  Procedia Computer Science  78 ( 2016 )  587 – 594 
3. Intent and Session Based Vulnerabilities 
3.1. Intent Based Vulnerabilities 
Intents are the mechanism part for the parallel communication between components of Android
3
. Intents are the 
special feature used to bind services, passing notification to broadcast receiver and to start activities and services. In 
Android, a component may receive intents from the other parts in the same Android app. Attackers can configure the 
attribute of manifest file android: exported which allows to accept intent from outside 
4
. One more security concern is 
intent interception. It allows a malicious app to receive an intent that was not intended for it. Due to the intent 
interception, there is a high chance of sensitive data leakage. For example, if a malign activity intercepted an intent then it
would appear on the screen as a benign or legitimate activity
24
. Following are the three different types of attacks, which 
come under intent based hijacking. 
3.1.1. Activity Hijacking 
Activity hijacking occurs when an intent is sent out implicitly and malicious attacker wants to filter that intent. 
For example, in an app, where user searches for an item and the app opens up the search results in a browser. The 
hijack attacker will intercept the URL before passing the intent to the real browser. The attacker is now capable of 
tracking user activity and attaches any data with the URL
24
.
3.1.2. Service Hijacking 
Service hijacking happens when multiple services can handle only one intent then the Android operating system 
resolves the destination, not by prompting user but based on which app was installed first. It is an option for 
attacker to get a malicious app on to the smartphone before the benign or legitimate app. Attacker can access data, 
spoof results and also hijack the whole session
24
.
3.1.3. Broadcast Hijacking 
Broadcast can easily be captured by malicious components because it does not require receiver signature. On 
other hand, due to not setting receiver signature priority, manifest file can easily be manipulated by malicious 
software. Attacker can access data and produces denial of service 
24
.
Intent hijacking tactics is shown in Fig. 1(a) without response and Fig. 1(b) shows intent hijacking tactics with 
attacker response. 
(a) Intent hijacking tactics (b) Intent hijacking with response (c) Session hijacking tactics 
Fig. 1: Session and intent hijacking 
3.2. Session Hijacking Vulnerabilities 
In session based hijacking, attacker can filtrate, command and control the whole user defined targeted device. In such type of 
hijack, a malign activity is imported in place of legitimate activity. The malign activity registers to get an app’s implicit intents 
and started in place of designated activity. When activity hijack is successful then the user component may be opened to a 
secondary false response attack and activity attacker can return malign response such as valuable information of device to 
invoking app. Fig. 1(c) shows the activity hijacking tactics. 
3.3. New Malware Family Related to Session and Intent Vulnerability 
The importance of out work become high, as there is a significant increase in intent/session hijacking based mal-ware 
recently. In Q3 and Q4 of year 2014, Android malware
22
 samples related to the intent based vulnerability and session 
hijacking have been identified as new malware families in Table 2. The intensity of malware is identified as low, high or 
risky. Risky intensity malware can be harmful to the user for some time. 
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Intent Based Family Session Based Family Intensity
FakeBank DroidSleep Low
VMWol FaceNi High
FakeJobO er FakeAV Risky
CarBerp FakeFlash High
Cawitt FakeMarket Risky
Cosha Obad High
CruseWind DroidDeluxe High
Table 2: Current intent and session hijack based Android malware 
4. Honey-pot and Proposed Methodology 
4.1. Honey-pot and Honey-net 
Honey-pot is an information collecting and suspicious measurement framework which captures anything with 
maliciousness and new tools for identifying attack too. It is used in network unit as a controlled network where every 
packet entering and leaving is monitored, captured and analysed. It is also the phenomenon of detection, protection and 
defence. This concept can be applied to mobile system network to catch suspicious malign mobile users. Honey-pots are 
basically two types. First one is physical honey-pot which is actual computer or mobile device that are set-up with more 
logging and security features. On the other hand, virtual honey-pots are a software package that allows you to fake many 
computer or mobile devices distributions at various places over the network from one mobile device or computer. Honey-
net is the collection of more than one honey-pot on the mobile device or computer. The main scenario of honey-pot is in 
Fig. 2. 
     Fig. 2: Honey-pot methodology 
4.2. Proposed Methodology 
As it is clear in Section 3 that intent and session hijack attacks benign app by trapping their intent and session. 
Therefore an enhancement of honey-pot methodology fit here. In our scenario, honey-pots are real devices or an emulated 
environment which is used to monitor intercepted system call between test app and our specially designed honey framed 
benign app. All the interactions are stored in a log. This log file (SysCall) is used for monitoring, detecting and analysing 
vulnerable Android apps in complete functionalities of Anti-Hijack. As shown in Fig. 3, we have deployed single system 
as honey-pot. We have started monkey runner tool to record system call separately for tested app and designed benign 
app.
4.2.1. Android Based SDK Tools Used 
5
ADB
2
: We have used ADB which is a robust tool that communicate with an Android emulator or Android 
virtual device. It contains five components: 
Client: This runs on our developer machine. We can search client from a shell by using an adb command.  
Server: This executes as a hide process on our developer machine. The server basically creates and control 
      interaction between the client and the adb daemon running on Android virtual device. 
Daemon: This runs as a back ground on each emulator or Android device instances. 
DumpSys
1
: It runs on the device and dumps fascinating information about the status of system services. Monkey 
Runner
13
: This tool is used for tracing system call of the tested app as well as benign app at runtime. 
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4.2.2. Experimental Setup 
After installing SDK, we have deployed test app, honey framed benign app, monkey runner tool, targeted android API in 
a single form. All these makes a system used as honey-pot. 
After deploying single system as honey-pot, we have started monkey runner tool to record system call separately for 
tested app and benign app. At this time this system behaves as a stand alone isolated system. 
After recording system call, we have measured any interception between tested app and honey framed benign app. We 
found any interception in the form of intent or session based information flow leakage in the SysCall. In SysCall, this will 
be immediately detected by Anti-Hijack. 
If there is no suspicious part in SysCall log file means app is benign. On the other hand if any suspicious pat is recorded 
then app is malicious in nature. Proposed framework is shown in Fig. 3. 
Intent based and session based novel algorithms are given below in Algorithm. 1 and Algorithm. 2. 
Fig. 3: Anti-Hijack: Proposed honey-pot framework for Android apps 
4.3. Proposed Algorithm 
Data: Tested App, Benign App 
Result: Malicious or benign app 
initialization: Android Virtual Device, Monkey; 
while App is executed with emulated or real environment do 
Execute tested app and Benign app; 
Start monkey runner tool; 
end 
while Read SysCall do 
Monitor benign and Analysing tested app; 
Intent or session attack detected; 
if (activity or Services or IntentFltr S ysCall)then 
Monitor benign and Analysing tested app; Intent 
or session attack detected; 
Tested app is “malign“; 
else 
Tested app is “Benign“; 
end 
end 
Algorithm 1: Anti-Hijack: Intent based novel algorithm 
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Data: Tested App, Benign App 
Result: Malicious or benign app 
initialization: Android Virtual Device, Monkey; 
while App is executed with emulated or real environment do 
Execute tested app and Benign app; 
Start monkey runner tool; 
end 
while Read SysCall do 
Monitor benign and Analysing tested app; 
Intent or session attack detected; 
if (Permission or BroadCR S ysCall)then 
Monitor benign and Analysing tested app; 
Intent or session attack detected; 
Tested app is “malign“; 
else 
Tested app is “Benign“; 
end 
end 
Algorithm 2: Anti-Hijack: Session based novel algorithm 
4.4. Honey Framed Benign App Design 
We have designed a honey framed benign app for malign app interception and monitoring, analysing the behaviour of 
malicious or malign app. In order to do this, we have developed a benign app which contains user input, network ping operation,
network service operation, traffic analysis, set theme concept and also include legitimate receiver in it. We have included user
input in benign app for monitoring any type of user sensitive information flow leakage (Intent) and network related code for 
network based behaviour (Session). We have also included theme concept for monitoring non profitable behaviour of app and 
legitimate receiver for monitoring runtime intent based update attack. 
5. Dataset 
We have collected a large set of intent based family apps and session hijacking based apps from GNOME
7
,
Chinese app store 
8
, Virus total detected apps 
12
 as in Table 3, Table 4. 
Intent Based Family # Of Apps 
FakeBank 40
VMWol 30
FakeJobO er 30
CarBerp 25
Cawitt 60
Cosha 50
CruseWind 40
Session Based Family # Of Apps 
DroidSleep 50
FaceNi 60
FakeAV 50
FakeFlash 80
FakeMarket 70
Obad 60
DroidDeluxe 60
Table 3: Intent hijack: Android malware data set Table 4: Session hijack: Android malware data set 
We have also collected unknown apps and some benign apps from Google app store
9
, Baidu app store 
10
, Amazon app 
store 
6
 and Samsung app store 
11
 to check the efficiency of our modules as in Table 5. 
Apps Collection # Of Apps
Intent based apps 275
Session hijack
based apps 430 
Unknown 9295 
Benign 10000
Table 5: Combined data set including benign and unknown 
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6. Results and Discussion 
6.1. Anti-Hijack: Detection Statistics 
We have tested all the data set with our proposed honey-pot device. The intent based detection is given in Table 
6 and session hijack based detection is given in Table 7. We find there is a lot of impact of honey based architecture 
in results. Below Table 8 presents the accuracy of our model and also includes the results of benign apps as well as 
unknown apps (M-malign, B-benign). 
Intent Based Family # Of Apps Anti-Hijack Detection 
FakeBank 40 38
VMWol 30 27
FakeJobO er 30 28
CarBerp 25 21
Cawitt 60 57
Cosha 50 47
CruseWind 40 36
Table 6: Intent hijack: Data set results 
Session Based Family # Of Apps Anti-Hijack Detection 
DroidSleep 50 46 
FaceNi 60 54 
FakeAV 50 48 
FakeFlash 80 77 
FakeMarket 70 66 
Obad 60 56 
DroidDeluxe 60 57 
Table 7: Session hijack: Data set results 
Apps Collection # Of Apps Anti-Hijack Detection 
Intent based apps 275 254
Session hijack
based apps 430 404 
Unknown 9295 8831 (M-5332,B-3499)
Benign 10000 9677
Table 8: Combined data set including benign and unknown app results 
6.2. Anti-Hijack: Ten-Fold Cross Validation 
We have measured our approach efficiency on the basis of tenfold cross validation using precision, recall and f-
measure (H-mean). We have calculated metrics on the basis of tenfold cross validation as in Table 9. Below Fig. 4 
presents the accuracy and ability of our proposed frame work Anti-Hijack. 
0.84          
0.835          
0.83          
0.825          
M
et
ri
cs
 0.82          
0.815          
0.81 
         
          
0.805          
0.8       Recall 
0.795      H-Mean      Precision         
0.79          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
     Groups     
Group Recall Precision H-Mean 
G1 0.79 0.80 0.794 
G2 0.80 0.81 0.804 
G3 0.81 0.80 0.804 
G4 0.81 0.82 0.814 
G5 0.80 0.79 0.794 
G6 0.82 0.83 0.824 
G7 0.80 0.81 0.804 
G8 0.83 0.82 0.824 
G9 0.81 0.82 0.814 
G10 0.82 0.84 0.834 
Fig. 4: Anti-Hijack: Precision, Recall and H-Mean Table 9: Anti-Hijack: Accuracy and ability (10-fold) 
Ques:1 Why we used honey-pot based technology? 
Honey-pot based technology assist low enforcement to track malign app and shut down bot-nets. It perform 
parallely on Android device or emulator using the concept of honey-net. This is very efficient for collecting 
malicious app information and detection. 
Ques:2 What are the advantages of Anti-Hijack? 
Anti-hijack produces less false positive because no legitimate or benign app uses honey-pot log file and there is 
a no need of known app’s signature so this is free from training phase. 
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7. Conclusion 
Proposed approach is a strong assessment framework for exploitation vulnerabilities using run-time analysis. Primary 
aim of honey-pot based model is to allow malicious apps to do its activities freely. This information is used for protection 
of benign apps and detection of malicious apps. In this paper, we made two key contributions, first, detecting intent 
hijacking malware and, second, detecting session hijacking malware using our framework Anti-Hijack. In future we 
would like to implement some more approaches to detect root exploits and scripts which violate sandbox to gain special 
privileges. In terms of exploiting vulnerabilities, we used all the known vulnerabilities whose status is complete in latest 
SDK version of Android 4.4. Therefore, we would like to test more vulnerabilities which are not known with the latest 
version of Android SDK 4.4. 
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